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I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants/Petitioners (hereafter "Defendants") 
Browning and David W. Rich hereby submit this Reply Brief in 
response to the arguments contained in the Brief of 
Plaintiff/Respondent (hereafter "Plaintiff") Vern L. Peterson, 
dated March 13, 1991 (hereafter "Plaintiff's Brief"). 
Defendants will not further address the issues raised regarding 
mootness related to preemption of this case by the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 et sea. On March 26, 1991, the United States District 
Court ruled that plaintiffs claims were not preempted by 
ERISA. Defendants also will not further address the factual 
matters, believing them to be fully before this Court without 
need for further elaboration. 
II. REPLY ARGUMENT: THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION SOUNDS IN 
CONTRACT 
A. Utah Has Not Yet Adopted a Public Policy Cause of 
Action as An Exception to the At-Will Employment 
Doctrine. 
Plaintiff asserts that this Court has already 
recognized as a cause of action the public policy exception to 
the at-will employment doctrine. Plaintiff's Brief at 
pp. 13-14. This Court's own words and rulings contradict 
plaintiff's argument. 
In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 
1989), this Court did not expressly recognize the public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine. Justices Durham and Stewart 
stated in dicta that Utah law should recognize such an 
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exception. Id. at 1042-43. Yet, both conceded that the 
exception had Mno application in this [Bejrube] case." Id. at 
1043. Chief Justice Hall and Justice Howe, in a concurring 
opinion, found no need to comment on the matter, id. at 1050. 
Justice Zimmerman, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, 
expressed a desire at some point to recognize such a cause of 
action, but declined to do so in Berube. Id. at 1051. Justice 
Zimmerman also acknowledged that the public policy exception 
was "not applicable to the present [Iterube] case." id. Thus, 
no public policy cause of action was at issue or recognized in 
Berube. 
Subsequent decisions of this Court interpreting the 
language and meaning of Berube have also indicated that no 
public policy cause of action exists in Utah. In Caldwell v. 
Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989), this 
Court stated: 
A majority of the Court [in Berube] also 
declined to adopt a broad public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
that would routinely make it a violation of 
public policy to discharge an employee in 
breach of an employment agreement for other 
than good cause. 
Id. at 485. Again, the Court only acknowledged that on some 
future occasion under appropriately compelling facts, such a 
cause of action might be recognized. The Court stated: 
Just as there was no occasion in Berube to 
describe any possible public policy 
exception in detail, so there is none here. 
However, a majority of the Court in Berube 
-2-
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did indicate that there are occasions when 
we might find a public policy exception to 
the employment-at -wi11 doctrine. 
Id. at 4 65, iii, 2 (emphasis added) . 
Accordingly r-> cause * % 
policy exception 
been found to exist t)*-**: defined 
•- !: it e 1 *~ public 
a i u t j na? "vei 
i e c i s ions :•-
B. Assuming Arguendo That Utah Has Recognized a 
Public Policy Exception, Such a Cause of Action 
Sounds in Contract, Not Tort. 
Assuming arguendo tr. r -if viv. ' ic policy exception i s 
? ^ansp of , uecisions preclude a 
tort cause of action and establish only one soundi 
cent i* act . 
In Lowe v. Sorensen Research Lu, inc. » "'"'cl P, 2d 6 6 B 
(Utah 1989), the plaintiff asserted tort causes ot action for 
*hr implied covenant of quod faith anr ai; 
dealing, t r.
 Jft % ;, employm-
contained in a policy manua -*\.~. •'. . : 
policy. Id dl lil]11'! ne CuuiL t> . i 
plaintiff's allegations, construed 
to the plaintiff, could .;"v^  -Is*-. «_ *» 
cent; r act il
 riii) riijcs i d , • ^ s v -
plaintiffs tort causes : 
any right t pursue tort claims i punitive damages. Indeed, 
Lowe decj s .t^^L. tused to recognize a 
-iS 
iolaticn of p. J: . j c 
' stated that t lic 
P I O S * I ,-J ^ 'O I HI I, I V 
d.:s.^  r-i action tor 
*
 l,<
- presence of 
_3„ 
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variety of wrongful discharge actions sounding in tort." Id, 
at 670. Lowe indicates that any Berube exceptions to the 
at-will doctrine sound in contract, not tort. 
Defendants submit that the governing analyses for this 
matter was stated by Justice Zimmerman in his Berube concurring 
opinion: 
I am of the view that any cause of action 
that may accrue to an employee discharged in 
violation of public policy would not 
ordinarily be in tort. I would imbed the 
public policy exception in the law by 
holding that every employment contract has 
an implied in law covenant that the employee 
will not be discharged in violation of 
public policy. Absent proof sufficient to 
show an independent tort/ damages 
recoverable for a breach of that covenant 
will be measured by contract principles only. 
771 P.2d at 1051 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, even if the Court has recognized the 
public policy cause of action, it has done so in contract, not 
C. Assuming Arguendo That This Court Has Not Yet 
Resolved the Question, the Public Policy 
Exception to the Employment At-Will Doctrine 
Should Sound Only in Contract, Consistent With 
the Other Exceptions to Employment At-Will, 
Plaintiff argues that this Court should recognize the 
public policy exception as a tort cause of action. Plaintiff's 
Brief at pp. 14-18. Defendants contend that the reasoning 
adopted by this Court for employment cases and the very nature 
of the public policy exception mandates otherwise. 
In Berube, Justice Durham noted, "The at-will rule, 
after all, is merely a rule of contract construction and not a 
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legal principle " Be rube, supra, x a L ± o 4 ^ . Thu s, t his 
Court has effectively recognized that even the at-will 
i vI ationship is akin to a contractual relationship and must be 
analyzed within a contract I i .mewurk, Consistent with this 
statement, the exceptions to the at will doctrine established 
nu in contract and provide only contract 
remedies. 
The implied express contract exception is analyzed 
undei a emit i m I I In rhe tjx.'i/tr- '* * ' breach .»< H:I 
implied covenai . ai+-h
 R ,,i(,t 
recognized H4 ah Zaldwell, supra "" < . f w ^M would 
d i s n lljt"! riii.i iJi istice Durham's Berube 
opinion states, "Utah has recognized that all ronti aels contain 
a covenan4 • good faith and fair dealing." l-.i, at 104h. 
Justice .. Berube i>pini»' states, "The lead 
opinion recognizes, as we held in Beck, that : u:eacn ot the 
covenant of good faith and f a i r dealing in Utah yields a e I a i in 
for contract: damages only," Id, a I luvl. 
Accordingly, the other exceptions to the at-will 
i ' :- utdD • ontract, This Court has 
clearly demonstrate • *- f< i U I I M W N J I I rui 1 y rontr act 
causes of action as exceptions to the at-will employment 
doctrine. 'finis is because the Court i <s -\--^^r *- •- ** * * 
employment relationship H^ contractu^ 
injuries sustained from tue \ -- * - * bargain inherent * the 
i e 1 a 1 1 o n s h in p . • • ,;:: " •. 
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There is no reason to now change course or logic and 
classify the last at-will exception, public policy, as a tort. 
The goal of the public policy exception is the same as the j 
other exceptions—to establish certain circumstances under 
which the employment relationship cannot be terminated. The 
public policy exception preserves the employment relationship 
by making certain aspects of it contractual. When the 
exception is violated the proper remedy is contract damages. 
Plaintiff's argument for tort treatment is based on 
the assertion that the public policy exception really does not 
arise out of a contractual relationship but is imposed by law. 
Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 15-16. This is true only to the same 
extent as with the implied covenant of good faith, which allows 
only for contract damages. In either case, however, the 
requirement imposed by law depends on the existing underlying 
employment relationship which is usually contractual in nature. 
The public policy exception must be viewed as part and 
parcel of the employment relationship. The duty to not 
terminate employment in violation of public policy is not a 
generalized duty. By necessity, it only exists by virtue of 
the underlying employment relationship. 
Similar to the implied covenant of good faith, the 
prohibition on a termination in violation of public policy 
simply creates a condition of the employment relationship 
providing that employment cannot be terminated for certain 
reasons. When employment is nonetheless terminated for those 
certain reasons, an employee has lost the benefit of the 
-6-
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contract imposed I>v " ,|e I'l'hlir pniiry r ule. Thus, the 
appropriate cause of action is in contract and ttie m<-,j * 
damages is contractual--to put. the employee back into the 
position ot <*Miip loynt^nl - -ve occupied ba'- for 
the breach of the imposed contract . J ., terminate emp y^-t 
li in ' M O i H i ii in of public policy. 
D . The Public Policy Exception Should Sound in 
Contract Because Punitive Damages Should Not Be 
Allowed For a Cause of Action Even This Court 
Finds Difficult to Define. 
This Court s h o u l d a l s o d e c l i n t . In i n r u q r u z e H IHJIJ J I o 
p o l i c e x c e p t i o n sound ing in t i n t because t h e t e rm p u b l i c 
r .*\ iiiinlf'l iiiHii t h a t <m employer w i l l he put • 
a!; risk for punitive damages Lot a tort of which iL hajs MM 
reasonable notice. 
In Be rube , I his Cniiit expioss I > i oneeded the ambiguous 
and uncertain nature of the public policy exception. Justice 
nam's opinion states: 
The tr uth is ti lat t .he theory of public 
policy embodies a doctrine of vague and 
variable quality, and, unless deducible in 
the given circumstances from constitutional 
or statutory provisions, should be excepted 
as the basis of the judicial determination, 
if at all, only with the utmost 
circumspection Public policy in one 
generation may not, under changed 
circumstances, be the public policy of 
another, 
771 P.2d .it 1043, quoting Patton v. United States. 281 U.S. 
'<76, 10b ! I iuli Similarly, ."lusH'/e Zimmerman's Berube 
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concurring opinion referred to a study noting "there is a good 
deal of divergence among the courts as to what each of these 
exceptions [including public policy] means.M I&. at 1050, n.l. 
In short, it is obvious this Court is struggling to 
define the meaning of the public policy exception. Allowing 
the imposition of punitive damages for a cause of action that 
this Court has never defined, let alone recognized, is 
inappropriate. 
In this connection, the United States Supreme Court 
has recently noted the constitutional problems inherent in 
allowing punitive damages to be awarded in circumstances of 
unlimited jury or judicial discretion. The Court has stated: 
One must concede that unlimited jury 
discretion—or unlimited judicial discretion t 
for that matter—in the fixing of punitive 
damages may invite extreme results that jar 
one's constitutional sensibilities. 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, No. 89-1279, 59 
U.S.L.W. 4157, 4161, 11 S.Ct. 1032 (March 4, 1991) (holding the 
punitive damages awarded in that case did not violate due 
process). 
Thus, were the Court to hold that the public policy 
exception sounded in tort, rather than contract, a significant 
due process (or at least fundamental fairness) question could 
arise given the absence of meaningful standards to guide the 
application of the law. See e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (striking loitering 
statute as unconstitutionally vague). 
-8-
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Tn RI i i I mi " j)/i i i! I ' 11 * • 'I'M pried ^o 
pun i s h m e n t (punitive d a m a g e s ) .ilispnl uuiice abotill IIIIH I I a i II n i 
tl conrliirt In avoid stirh c o n s e q u e n c e s . P l a i n t i f f , m the 
ot . hand, argues i iiiii uniunyt'i . n* • < < • 'u ieni ions '-'i 1 I 
not have tu viorry at.nut liability uridei I he public p o l i n t'aii'.t1 
i f I -I i i I' 1 ai nt i f f ' s Br i ef at n I ' I I a i n1 H i " s admoni 1.1 uu 
Lo "be c o n s c i e n t i o u s i i I iMI s c u n it . Ml MMI <" * 11• iIi this 
C o u r t ' s cases conceini rig what conduct may hi rnay not subject it 
, p i Lite* I | H i ("IO 1 icy except- • on and p u n i t i v e damages 
Other c o m I s ) ecoqn i A i nq illii" iinil i I 11 i Il 11 \ P M u'l M H I 
as a contract have noted that such problems appeal to be 
lesui IP i i in I i i 11>(i»111.until Tn Biockmeyer v. D u n & 
B r a d s t r e e t , 33 S N, W ." 11 Mil (W J , 1 ' l B i1, «' 11 - > W , s c o i, s . , »|" " 
Court stated: 
In tort actions, the only 1 imitations are 
those of proximate cause or public policy 
considerations. Punitive damages are also 
allowed. In contract actions, damages are 
limited by the concept of foreseeability and 
mitigation, , , . Therefore, we conclude 
that a contract action is most appropriate 
for wrongful discharges. The contract 
action is essentially predicated on the 
breach of an implied provision that an 
employer will not discharge an employee for 
refusing to perform an act that violates a 
clear mandate of public policy. Tort 
actions cannot be maintained. 
id. at 84 I . 
In Cterl.i.ng.,prua. Ii ic , v • Oxfoi d# 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 
1988), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated: 
Since a public policy discharge action is 
essentially predicated on the breach of an 
9 • 
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implied provision that an employer will not 
discharge an employee for an action done in 
the public interest/ a contract cause of 
action is most appropriate. The exclusive 
contract approach strikes a fair balance in 
that it provides employees with protection 
from employer retaliation, while at the same 
time limiting recovery to contract 
remedies. If an employer's conduct in 
breaching a contract of employment is 
sufficiently egregious or extreme, the 
employee can still claim tort damages on a 
cause of action for outrage. 
Id. at 385. 
The purpose of punitive damages in Utah is to punish 
and deter conduct that is not likely to be deterred by other 
means. Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 
330, 337 (Utah 1985). No punishment should occur until the 
reason for punishment can be clearly articulated. Punitive 
damages have no place here even assuming the existence of a 
cause of action, since the cause has never been previously 
defined and defendants have had no notice of its parameters to 
allow them to conform their conduct accordingly. 
E. This Court Has Specifically Found That Contract 
Remedies Sufficiently Protect Similar Interests 
to Those Protected by the Public Policy Exception. 
Plaintiff argues that a tort claim and punitive 
damages must be allowed regarding the public policy exception 
because contract damages alone will not assure compliance with 
the dictates of public policy. Plaintiff's Brief at 
pp. 15-16. Defendants urge this Court to reject this argument 
for the same reasons it did so in the first party insurance 
-10-
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context—name . ^&& sut t ic^n. 
appropriate relief • •••. -
Even i i t h e n u h l i c p o l i c y except, ion sounds in 
c o n t r a c t , employers »JLJ 1 > - -"• '*""k '""nil pnujiiLi • il images if 1 he 
c o n d u c t a t iojsuu c o n s t i t u t e s an i n d e p e n d e n t t o i l , 11 . , , ' i ' 
sain 1 i runs H M M in t i t ' tc i improper conduct liy e m p l o y e r s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , c o n t r a c t il.nn.njcn '.in MM MM iiniipninc nrju,< I I .i 
w e l l . 
In Beck y . i dimuLu x i i su i ance Exchange, MM P ?<\ 7<)r> 
(Utah 19B5) t h i s Court hcli l t ha t in a l i i r s t iniiiM,, n inn > 
pf^nf-exf, an i n s u r e d cou ld not recover i o r t damages a q a i m I an 
w.Hiiii'i . H . n I Ii » I , I ' M I" " c o n d u c t . M . a t HUU. 
In so concluding, the Court no Led: . , -:' •' ""• 
[T]he practical end of providing a strong 
incentive for insurers to fulfill their 
. • contractual obligations can be accomplished 
as well through a contract cause ot action, 
without the analytical straining 
necessitated by the tort approach diid with 
far less potential for unseen consequences : 
t o t: h e ] a w o f c o n t r a c t s 
Beck at 709, The same rational iinai, m in a i in i in Beck all!" 
applies here• 
T|
 "• fv n ' in Beck feasoned that the duties in, a 1 n u t 
party insurance relationship ane coi'M: i m, t m i I >l I m l i n c ai \ > , 
Id, at 800 As already noted above, tins Court has also 
a I  I  n a d y < Il a v a i f i nil I la i 'inp 11 ny iiiiicn I  r P ! a t i o n s h i p , in i I 
at-will, an contractual in nature. Similar t,-u« the 111 a 1, pa,i I \ • 
insurance context, the employment relationship consists of 
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duties flowing solely between employer and employee. The 
employer has no fiduciary duty to represent the interests of an 
employee vis-a-vis third parties nor does an employment 
relationship possess any more of the vestiges of reliance and 
trust than does the first party insurance relationship. 
In short/ the employment relationship is analogous to 
the first party relationship discussed in Beck, the breach of 
which can only be remedied by contractual damages. If 
contractual damages are sufficient to assure that insurers 
comply with the strong public policy interest in fair claims 
practice recognized in Beck, they are equally adequate to 
assure that employers do not terminate employees in violation 
of similar public policy concerns. 
F. The Fact That Other Jurisdictions Recognize the 
Public Policy Exception as a Tort Does Not Change 
the Logic or Result of the Foregoing Reasoning. 
Plaintiff contends this Court should declare that the 
public policy exception sounds in tort because a number of 
other jurisdictions have done so. Plaintiff's Brief at 
pp. 14-15 and Addendum.2*/ Defendants submit that these cases 
•i' Respondent's Addendum VII attached to Respondent's Brief 
purports to summarize the position of each state regarding 
whether the public policy exception is a contract or a tort. 
Respondent lists the following cases as decisions concluding 
the cause of action is a tort. A closer reading of some of the 
cases cited, however, reveals that no such determination has 
been made: 
North Carolina—Sides v. Duke Hospital, 328 S.E.2d 818 
(N.C. App. 1985) (recognizes malicious interference with a 
contract but never actually says that wrongful discharge is a 
tort); Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1989) 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
-12-
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shuul 'J m*1 i ' I 11 il 11 ui ill 11 IN 'k', t I 11 f a s h i o n b e c a u s e t h i s Court: 
has p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d then l e a s o i n n q . 
Thi r Cour t has a w e l l - d e s e r v e d r e p u t a t i o n f o r 
i rulopendtjn' ' , i11 u*v> " ll ' '" I M M I i fMFnin i nei r o n c e r n i n g any 
p r o p o s i t i o n nr c a u s e of ant j on p t i o i hi detei'iiii n i IH| nm wv 
* Him i I mi d u n in In Th i s Court has r e j e c t e d l o c k s t e p 
a d h e r e n c e In > 1H cot i lu:.i i I ." ^I1 { " ' i M n s 01 t r e n d s . 
For example , in Be&k, t h e Coin I s t a t e d , "We r e c o g n i z e 
I in .in ,i nihil in r in I 'i in! " . t a in s pe rmi t HII i n s u r e d t o i n s t i t u t e a t i n t 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t an in . j . n . '. I i "i M ^ d f a i t h i n 
ii ' f i r s t p a r t y * s i t u a t i o n " Mil I'./id HI flU\ N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
111 i i I I Il I I if l u l l measu re o l t h e r e a s o n i n g t o i be LI' I h 
( F o o t n o t e r o n t i n n e d l imn p r e v i o u s p a g e . ) 
( f o l l o w s Si.des r e a s o n i n g but: on ly r e c o g n i z e s a c a u s e of a c t i o n 
f c > i"" w r o n g f \ i I  d i s c h a r g e) . 
C o n n e c t i c u t - - S h e e t s v . Teddy F r o s t e d F o o d s , I n c . , 427 
A 2 d 385 (Conn. 1980) ( r e c o g n i z e s t h e t r e n d t o w a r d s t o r t s b u t 
d o e s d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c o g n i z e t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y e x c e p t i o n 
a s a t o r t :i n C o n n e c t i c u t ) , 
M a r y l a n d — K e a r n v . b o u t n ^^^i : t u e i i b U i nu&^L_L<a 
504 A,2d 1154 (Md. App. 1 9 8 6 ) , ( r e c o g n i z e s a p u b l i c p o l i c y 
c a u s e of a c t i o n b u t doe r r ~ t s t a t e whe+^er *f ^onnrls ; 
c o n t r a c t ) , 
Montana—Nye v. Department of Livestock, is 
incorrectly cited by Respondent. The correct cite is 639 P.2d 
498 (Mont,, 1982) (court never distinguishes between tort and 
contract). 
Texas--Sabine v» Pilot Services, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 
S W 2d 733 (Tex., 1985) and McClendon v. Inaersol-Rand Co,, 779 
S.W.2d 69 (Tex,, 1989) (neither case indicates whether ^f 
recognizing a tort or contract cause of action.) 
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contract and tort causes of action and chose the contract 
analysis, despite the so-called majority view. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims of what is or is 
not a majority or a trend/ defendants urge the Court to reach 
the identical result it did in Beck for the same rationale. 
For reasons of both policy and logic, should the Court 
recognize a public policy cause of action it should sound in 
contract/ not tort. x-:••••. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendants 
respectfully request this Court to rule that the public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine, if it is to be recognized in 
Utah/ sounds in contract and not in tort. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lo^ day of April/ 1991. 
JONES/ WALDO/ HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
" ^t&^feMcSkg. 
William B. Bohling 
Michael Patrick O'Brien 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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